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ABSTRACT
In much of Eastern Africa, the last decade has seen a renewed
interest in spatial development plans that link mineral
exploitation, transport infrastructure and agricultural
commercialisation. While these development corridors have
yielded complex results – even in cases where significant
investments are yet to happen – much of the existing analysis
continues to focus on economic and implementation questions,
where failures are attributed to inappropriate incentives or lack of
‘political will’. Taking a different – political economy – approach,
this article examines what actually happens when corridors ‘hit
the ground’, with a specific interest to the diverse agricultural
commercialisation pathways that they induce. Specifically, the
article introduces and analyses four corridors – LAPSSET in Kenya,
Beira and Nacala in Mozambique, and SAGCOT in Tanzania –
which are generating ‘demonstration fields’, economies of
anticipation and fields of political contestations respectively, and
as a result, creating – or promising to create – diverse pathways
for agricultural commercialisation, accumulation and
differentiation. In sum, the article shows how top-down grand-
modernist plans are shaped by local dynamics, in a process that
results in the transformation of corridors, from exclusivist ‘tunnel’
visions, to more networked corridors embedded in local
economies, and shaped by the realities of rural Eastern Africa.
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A new wave of agricultural commercialisation is being promoted across Africa’s eastern
seaboard.1 Development corridors, linking infrastructure development, mining and agri-
culture for export, are central to this. As a result, new spatial politics are being generated by
such interventions, as formerly remote borders and hinterlands are expected to be trans-
formed through foreign investment and aid projects.2 Ports, roads, mines and plantations
are all linked in grand modernist visions. Many powerful actors are involved, from inter-
national corporates to states and domestic elites. But what actually happens on the
ground? Do the grand visions play out as expected? Who gets involved and who loses out?
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This paper introduces a special section including three articles – on Kenya, Mozambi-
que and Tanzania – that aim to go beyond the rhetoric and hype and delve into the reali-
ties as they play on the ground. As with the ‘land rush’ that followed the food and financial
crises of the mid-2000s, the outcomes are not as expected, complicating the discourses of
either those supporting or opposing large-scale land investments.3 However, wider state-
and capital-promoted visions of modernist development linked to investment corridors do
have material effects, we argue, creating new networks and practices, and fostering new
processes of change.
Much discussion of growth and investment corridors has focused on economic devel-
opment potential, and the multiple implementation challenges. Existing literature has
focused on, for example, investment promotion and foreign investment flows; infrastruc-
ture as a growth and development constraint; the mechanics of spatial planning and
spatial development initiatives; cost/benefit analysis and investment return appraisal, as
well as the sequencing of interventions in corridor development.4 In this literature, corri-
dor developments, as regional planning efforts, are presented as encouraging investment
in infrastructure, minerals and agriculture.5 Proponents argue that linking transport infra-
structure development with agriculture and mining means that key constraints, particu-
larly of landlocked countries and regions, can be released, and growth potentials
enhanced, with poverty reduction resulting in the longer term.6
Much of this commentary ignores the complex political dynamics behind such corridor
developments, and very little attention has been focused on the political economy of cor-
ridors as they reshape landscapes, livelihoods and economies.7 While hyped as generators
of economic growth and drivers of modernity in otherwise ‘backward’ and remote places,
there are other implications.8 As demonstrations of state power in such borderland, fron-
tier areas, corridors potentially bring control and order, suppressing alternative cross-
border, often illicit, economies and quashing secessionist and opposition groups, as
central states assert their power.9 As sites of potential accumulation, alliances between
domestic elites, both local and national, with international corporate capital, finance insti-
tutions and international aid donors is much in evidence, suggesting new circuits of power
and influence in such regions.10 With major investments in infrastructure – roads, sea and
air ports, as well as mines, markets and large farms – the landscape is imagined to be fun-
damentally refashioned. Such plans may challenge previous livelihood systems, potentially
undermining the mobility of pastoralists or the local production patterns and economic
relations of smallholders, and altering the environment in the process.11
In this article – and the trio of special section articles by Chome, Gonçalves, and Sulle,
all of which adopt different perspectives on political economy12 – we explore the political
dimension of corridors, focusing in particular on the implications for commercial agricul-
tural development as a core component. Taking a political economy lens to the revival of
spatial planning and corridor development – particularly focusing on agricultural devel-
opment dimensions – we explore the way corridor development is framed, the actors
involved, the way power is exerted and reconfigured, and the winners and losers from
such major developments. In sum, we examine the material consequences of such plans
on the ground – and through which diverse patterns of accumulation, differentiation,
negotiation and agricultural commercialisation emerge – as people anticipate, demon-
strate or contest these high-modernist visions.
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The rest of the article is organised as follows. Firstly, we briefly discuss the emergence of
‘corridors’ in development debates and their historical precursors on the African conti-
nent. Secondly, we introduce the cases from Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania
(Figure 1). Thirdly, we explore how agricultural development corridors are framed. In
the latter, we contrast two visions of corridors, a linear, extractivist ‘tunnel’ model,
Figure 1. Map of study sites in Eastern Africa.
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involving a limited set of actors usually involved in enclave-based export production, with
a more informal ‘network’ model that allows a wider range of actors to be included, and
that emerges in a more haphazard way as a result of the existing of a corridor plan, even in
the absence of significant investments. Fourthly, and in reflecting on some of the findings
discussed in depth in the three case study articles in this special section, we then explore
some of the outcomes, first in relation to patterns of accumulation and differentiation, and
around the diverse pathways of agricultural commercialisation that potentially result from
corridor development. We conclude with some reflections on the implications of our
findings for debates about the development of commercial agriculture in eastern Africa.
The return of large-scale investments
Such high-profile interventions, aimed at transforming backward areas with a particular
vision of ‘development’, are of course not new.13 From the colonial era onwards, major
infrastructure developments have been central to state-building in Africa, and the asser-
tion of state power over places and people, particularly in marginal border areas. The
history of development in the continent is littered with such examples, including in the
field of agriculture.14 Many have failed, and existed as expensive white elephants; others
have continued with on-going state subsidy, while others have been reimagined, and
repurposed through smallholder investments and other local capital interests.15 Across
each of three cases presented in this special section, the precursors of these recent corridor
developments are important to understand, as they provide the layered histories of devel-
opment intervention on top of which new efforts are imposed.
An important question is why such large-scale investments have returned to dominate
the agricultural development scene today? In debates about African agriculture, a long-
term consensus that a smallholder-led green revolution was the best solution has been
recently challenged.16 In this way, the conventional wisdom – for several decades, and
with plenty of evidence to back it up – was that top-down, technocentric forms of com-
mercialisation in agriculture (of crops or livestock) are unlikely to succeed, and instead
efforts must be expended in supporting smallholder development.17 But today, in the
context of an increasingly globalised agriculture, and consumer demands for cheap
food, large-scale commercial agriculture, in the form of estates or plantations (sometimes
with smallholder outgrower schemes) has been revived as a model for the first time in
decades.18 Growth corridors are perhaps the most prominent example of this new
trend. Why is this, given the long history of failure of large-scale commercial agricultural
projects in Africa in achieving their stated objectives?
Across Africa, growth corridors are featured prominently as part of current donor-led
plans, receiving significant attention and financial support.19 For example, they are pro-
moted through the New Alliance for food security and nutrition launched at the 2012
G8 Summit at Camp David, the World Economic Forum, the African Development
Bank, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, the Food and
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, among others. Additional donors from
BRICS countries, often with stronger links to state-owned enterprises and domestic
private companies, are also involved, with Brazil having interests in commercial agricul-
tural development, especially in Mozambique, and China, particularly in infrastructure
development across Africa.20
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Projects are often conceived so as to deliver more than one type of infrastructure, and
for more than one sector, providing additional business incentives to investors.21 This is
because it has proven difficult to persuade investors to fund infrastructure purely for agri-
culture owing to the risks involved. For this reason, minerals extraction and agricultural
development become tied together as part of corridor development, with an export-led
mineral/agricultural commodity boom expected to follow. The latter is, for example, a pro-
minent feature of the Lamu Port-South-Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor
that begins in Kenya, and of the Beira and Nacala corridors in Mozambique, all of
which seek to leverage physical transport infrastructure and mineral extraction so as to
create value-chains that will bring smallholders (and pastoralists) in these previously mar-
ginalised regions closer to external markets.22 Following in this precedent, a strong narra-
tive of comparative advantage in export growth, and competition in a globalised economy,
frames the debate, with roads and ports opening up opportunities – and reducing costs –
essential to making the once uneconomic enterprises competitive.23
Thus, large agro-business and food processing multinational companies, such as Vale,
Oderbrecht, Mitsui, Cargill, Bunge and Archers Daniels Midland, amongst others, become
involved, often with combined interests in infrastructure, mining and agriculture.24 They
in turn see state-supported corridors as a route to reduce costs and risks of investment. A
spatially-concentrated approach is also attractive for those companies seeking to aggregate
supply and sell inputs. Thus, SABMiller, a major brewing company, sees corridor invest-
ments as a route to gain stable supplies of products from organised smallholders. In the
same way, major input suppliers, such as Yara, identify corridors as areas for new
markets for fertiliser, crop protection products, seeds and machinery.25
The modalities for delivering agricultural development, meanwhile, typically include
the use of public–private partnerships, catalytic funding and support for value-chain
and market development. For example, TransFarm Africa talk of the need to ‘tie small-
holders into the stream of commerce’.26 On the other hand, the Seas of Change (a
long-term applied research, innovation and exchange programme) value-chains initiative
looked for ‘commercially viable’ farmers to support.27 While there is much rhetoric about
‘inclusive’ business models, public, private, even community ‘partnerships’, and ‘win-win’
outcomes for economic growth,28 these claims must be interrogated, asking, for example,
who is central to the partnership, what power dynamics are at play, and what processes of
exclusion result.
As a melting pot for alliances and interactions, corridor developments therefore
become sites for intense discursive and political contests about development trajectories.
These may be, for example, over the framing of the projects, between those who see oppor-
tunities for local economic regeneration, as clusters or hubs of economic activity, and
those who emphasise the export dimension and an extractivist logic. Imaginaries of devel-
opment, between high modernist framings and more locally-driven networked alterna-
tives are played out, across actors, with multiple variants in different sites, reflecting
particular positions, histories and on-going local struggles. Contests also occur over
opportunities for accumulation, as alliances between external and domestic capital are
forged with local and national political and business elites. For national politicians –
from presidents downwards – such mega-projects are opportunities to demonstrate
power and benevolence, asserting control; very useful political resource during election
periods and when trying to quash rebellion and opposition in such areas.29 For donors
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and NGOs equally, having visible, flagship projects, demonstrating images of success, is
always appealing,30 and of course, existing patterns and practices of livelihoods and
economy may come into conflict with these grand, transformative visions, resulting in
contestations by different actors, including anticipations of the promised, prosperous
futures, as the cases discussed in this special section demonstrate.
A view of four corridors on Africa’s eastern seaboard
The cases that this article introduces and analyses are the LAPSSET Corridor; the
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor in Tanzania, simply known as SAGCOT, and
the Beira and Nacala Corridors in Mozambique. There are notable variations in the
designs and outcomes of these corridors, as will be shown below, but the general trend
is towards more informal ‘network’ models, even when the initial design, such as in the
case of LAPSSET and Nacala corridors, envisioned a linear, extractivist ‘tunnel’ model.
SAGCOT and Beira, on the other hand, started out as ‘network’ models – in SAGCOT,
this happened by default, as it was not a single corridor designed at one moment, but a
historically-layered set of interventions, while in Beira, the ‘network’ was a result of
donor-funded outgrower and smallholder schemes. In addition, while corridors are
seen as driving development in otherwise relatively underdeveloped areas in Kenya and
Mozambique, SAGCOT in Tanzania was centred on a long-settled agricultural region,
and seen as a route to boosting commercial agricultural development on the back of
long-term investments in sugar and other agro-industries.
During the time of research and writing, the corridors were at different stages of devel-
opment, and all had varying financial arrangements. As mentioned above, while the
public-private partnership model is prominent across all the corridors, in practice, the
sources of private capital and the nature of state engagement (of local and central govern-
ments) significantly varies. In LAPSSET, the central government is the main financier of
the supporting transport infrastructure components, such as the new port at Lamu, whose
continued construction has been supported almost entirely by Chinese loans. Also, the
main economic rationale behind LAPSSET continues to be transportation of crude oil
from the Turkana basin in Northern Kenya. While aid from the United Kingdom and
capital fromWestern agribusinesses provide the main source of funding in Beira, Brazilian
and Chinese capital is more important on the Nacala corridor, where mining is providing
the main economic rationale. SAGCOT, which was designed and promoted by the regime
of former President Jakaya Kikwete, brought together a host of global agribusiness capital
linked together through the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa, with
support from Western states through the G8. However, the development of SAGCOT
since early 2019 has been complicated by the change of priorities by a new administration,
headed by President John Magufuli, which has withdrawn its support of SAGCOT
altogether (Sulle, this issue).
Despite these variations, the narratives that frame these corridor investments are all
focused on ‘growth’, and in respect of agriculture, a discourse centred on generating a
missed African ‘green revolution’. This is linked to boosting food production, creating
‘breadbasket’ regions, but also with agricultural export crops or livestock as central
products.31
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As mentioned above, in Mozambique and Kenya in particular, the anchor project – the
investment that drives the economic incentives to invest, particularly in core transport
infrastructure – is not agriculture, but mining or oil/gas extraction. In Tanzania, by con-
trast, commercial agriculture has been more central from the start. This is significant in the
political economy of such investments, as alliances between international extractive indus-
tries and the state are often at the heart of corridor politics. International aid donors are
involved too and, as Table 1 shows above, a wide range of donors have been engaged.32
Their focus is usually more on the agricultural dimensions, often downplaying the extra-
ctivist origins of the corridor; although often with major companies from the donor
country involved. The focus for aid donors is more on regional development, and
trickle-down economic benefits for ‘the poor’, and involvement of smallholders through
contract farming and other initiatives linked to ‘public-private partnerships’. In sum,
across the three cases, there are a range of historical origins, different agroecological
and social-political contexts and different mixes of investments and associated actors. Cor-
ridors are far from uniform even in their constructions as grand visions; and, as the cases
show, the outcomes are extremely diverse too.
Corridors: the panacea for agricultural growth and development?
Corridors are therefore very high-profile and expensive interventions, often central to state
development plans, and requiring partnerships with private capital and finance, often with
Table 1. Brief profiles of four corridors. Adapted from Rebecca Smalley. 2017. “Agricultural Growth
Corridors on the Eastern Seaboard of Africa: An Overview.” APRA Working Paper 1.
Nacala Beira SAGCOT LAPSSET
Corridor
type
Transport corridor to
mining areas, linked
to ProSAVANA
agricultural
investment
Agricultural growth
corridor, especially
via commercial
agriculture and
outgrower schemes
Agricultural growth
corridor, linked to
sugar, rice and
commercial farming
Economic and transport
corridor, opening up
‘Kenya’s north’, linked
to tourism, agriculture
and an oil pipeline
from Turkana
Locations in
main port
country
Nampula, Niassa,
Zambezia provinces
of Mozambique
Manica, Sofala, Tete
provinces of
Mozambique
Dar Es Salaam, Iringa,
Mbeya, Morogoro,
Katavi, Njombe, Rukwa
regions, of Tanzania
Lamu, Garissa, Marsabit,
Isiolo, Meru, Turkana,
Samburu, Baringo and
Laikipia counties of
Kenya
Underlying
objectives
Commercialisation and
rehabilitation of
agriculture and
support of mining
industry
Commercialisation and
rehabilitation of
agriculture, support
of mining industry
Agricultural
commercialisation to
improve food security,
livelihoods and
ensures environmental
sustainability
Regional trade and
economic
development,
infrastructure, energy
security
Influences
and
narratives
Breadbasket, Cerrado,
Brazilian mining
firms
Breadbasket, Cerrado,
‘empty’ arable land,
mining firms
Green revolution, export
agriculture
Trade, investments of
various kinds, including
agro-commercialisation
and development
Donors JICA, Brazilian
government
DFID, Norad, WB, JICA DFID, WB, EU, USAID AfDB, WB, EU, China
Anchor
project
Coal mining Coal mining Building on long-term
sugar production
Oil pipeline from Turkana
and other transport
infrastructure (a port,
roads, railways and
airports)
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international origins. As they are sometimes envisaged as cross-border initiatives, they
confront not only domestic politics, but regional, cross-national politics too. Plans for
such corridors are often quintessentially ‘high modernist’ projects, with standardised,
grid-like plan, framed by a ‘will to improve’ – to employ Tanya Li’s terms – by develop-
ment donors and states, in line with a particular vision of progress.33 These styles of devel-
opment in turn generate a style of ‘techno-politics’, where certain types of expertise and
technological intervention are privileged, each with exclusionary characteristics.34
However, as James Ferguson has argued, this model of ‘seeing like a state’ is upset in
the neoliberal world where ‘developmental states’ in Africa have less reach and traction
and where companies establish territorialised enclaves.35 These have their own security
and state-like features, as capital ‘hops’ between disparate sites where rule, order and capi-
talist accumulation can be assured.36
Yet, as the cases presented elsewhere in this special section show, in practice, neither a
state-driven modernist plan nor enclave capitalism results. In Kenya, Mozambique and
Tanzania, local anticipations of the promised prosperous future; ‘demonstration fields’
that are turned into capital for future government and donor supported projects; and
local contestations of the grand-vision for the commercialisation of agriculture; all
promise to generate many hybrid forms, as different visions compete and converge. In
this way, state plans for agricultural commercialisation within the imagined corridors –
often presented as a vision of an extractivist ‘tunnel’, with limited connections to wider
economies – frequently fall apart. The realities of rural Africa on the margins impinge,
transforming economic prospects and forcing projects to morph into a new project
more closely aligned with the interests of local capital. Enclaves in the form of large-
scale farm investments can never fully isolate themselves and must articulate with other
forms of local capitalism, politics and negotiation on the ground. Large estates thus
very often seek to engage with outgrowers (smallholder farmers) as well as medium-
scale farmers, accommodating local producers in the wider enterprises.37 As Sulle (this
special section) shows for the case of sugar production in Tanzania, the challenges of
reliance solely on an estate model has meant an increasing reliance on smallholder out-
growers, increasing the reach of the company on to outgrowers’ land indirectly, while
also incorporating a great diversity of people into the dynamic of agricultural commercia-
lisation promoted by the SAGCOT corridor.38
Corridors thus have elements of both state-led imposition, supported by grand plans,
public finance, private capital and donor funding, and privatised corporate-led enclave
developments, largely outside state influence, but yet are still contingent on local contexts
and political negotiations.39 In particular, corridors must always articulate with endogen-
ous processes of capital accumulation, and local elite interests may help transform a simple
plan into something more complex, embedding externally-driven processes into local con-
texts.40 This more hybrid networked reality offers an interesting window for understand-
ing agrarian change, the changing nature of rural investment and governance patterns in
Africa. States, through alliances with private domestic and international capital, attempt to
extend their developmental reach, and private companies, including those classically
involved in enclave extractivism, aim to ensure ‘local content’, ‘social license’ and ‘linkages’
as part of business plans.41
A political economy of corridors is therefore about how contests over the framing of
development intervention – influenced by a range of social and technical ‘imaginaries’ –
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results in diverse outcomes dependent on the configurations of local interests, as they
unfold over time.42 It is not a simplistic story of state or corporate imposition that
results in local dispossession and resistance.43 On the contrary, and as Chome (this
section) shows, the ways in which capital and state power are deployed reconfigure pro-
cesses of production of bureaucratic authority and citizen participation. Across all the
cases, different actors are seen to benefit, including rural farmers, government bureaucrats,
politicians and local business interests. The logics of capital, as commercialisation extend
into the margins, results in the creation of new opportunities.
There are of course losers too. Speculative land enclosures, changing employment
opportunities and project imposed restrictions emerge too. As Chome (this section)
shows, the resulting competition for land and resources, as individuals and local groups
compete to secure a place within LAPSSET’s promised future, has not only engendered
an understanding of ethnic others as ‘immigrants’ or ‘guests’ within the corridor, but
has fuelled what Borras and Franco have termed as ‘broad types of political conflicts’
within and between the state and social forces.44 The conflicts, as Chome shows, have
created a complex social and political tapestry of inclusion and exclusion.45 Moreover,
as Sulle (this section) illustrates, due to difficulties in accessing village lands in Tanzania,
large-scale land-based investments, previously envisioned within SAGCOT’s plans, have
not materialised, and those that exist have been linked with smallholder outgrowing
schemes.46
Patronage, accumulation and social differentiation
The penetration of the state and capital into previously remote and marginalised areas
inevitably results in significant reconfigurations in local political economies.47 But the pro-
cesses of change are neither predictable nor inevitable. The interactions of capital with the
state, and its intersections with local politics are always complex, and subject to contesta-
tion. The core questions for our study are central to any agrarian political economy analy-
sis: who does what, who owns what, who gets what and what do they do with it?48 It is the
intersection of these processes of accumulation, reproduction and differentiation with
local politics and livelihoods that we are centrally interested in.
While corridors are promoted around a narrative of development, and trickle-down
impacts of growth to the poor, past experiences have shown that these benefits have
often not been forthcoming. Equally, such corridors are often assumed to be intervening
on a blank slate, one where only backward, deprived and marginalised people exist, and so
benefits are inevitable.49 Despite the narrative of transforming ‘idle’, ‘underutilised’ land
into ‘modern’, ‘productive’ agriculture or mining enterprises, of course all these areas in
the hinterlands of the new corridor transport infrastructure are already occupied and
used.50 In all cases, vibrant local economies, with their own dynamics pre-exist such inter-
ventions, and in many cases, have been growing and prospering independently, as in the
case of the growth of commercial livestock production in the pastoral hinterlands of the
LAPSSET project in Kenya.51 As external capital confronts endogenous enterprise and
associated interests, conflicts inevitably arise.
Not surprisingly, contests over land and resources become central, with disputes often
fanning out into the wider national, sometimes international, politics. The high-profile
nature of such investments also means that they sometimes become focal points for
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insurgent groups, militias and terrorist organisations, influencing the dynamics of conflict
in the region. Equally, for the state, opening up frontier areas affords the ability to extend
state control in such areas, undermining the economic and political base of opposition
forces. Whether as part of confronting ‘terrorism’, as in Kenya’s struggle with Somalia-
based violent Islamist organisation, Al-Shabaab, or quashing a regionally-associated, but
powerful opposition as in Renamo in Mozambique, the economic transformation of
such areas, and their incorporation under state control is a central part of the securitisation
politics of corridors, sometimes giving rise to violence and the militarisation of these
areas.52
How can we understand these complex dynamics across cases? As already discussed,
there is a broad network of actors that comes together around corridors. These include
corporate players, government officials (national and local), international/national
capital and local (endogenous capital), other local elites and often relatively asset-rich,
often male, farmers and livestock owners/traders able to engage in such markets. Corri-
dors are spaces of social and political control, rooted in complex ethnic and political his-
tories. They also have become sites for the exercise of power by state agencies in marginal
areas – whether Mozambique Ports and Railways, or CFM and Agência Vale do Zambeze,
or departments of the overly-centralised national administration in Kenya, and the
LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority (LCDA).
Regardless of the exact motivations in each case, the extension of capital into marginal
areas is not straightforward. Despite the grand plans, in many cases the realisation on the
ground has been limited. While building a road or rail line often initiates the corridor
development, what happens next is less clear. Without feeder roads, the benefits of a
major highway may be limited. An emphasis on freight trains for extracting minerals,
for example, may exclude local passengers and their produce. And the type of follow-
on land based investments – large farms and estates for example – often face problems
of markets, labour, logistics and finance.53 Economic activity in the early phases therefore
often emerge from ‘economies of anticipation’, whereby future benefits from land and
investment are betted on through, for example, the appropriation and enclosure of
land, the speculative investment in business ventures – a processing plant, a silo or a ware-
house – and the assertion of rights, based on claims of indigeneity and ethnic territoriality.
The latter, as mentioned above, has vividly intersected in Lamu along the proposed
LAPSSET corridor, as illustrated by Chome (this section) as well as Gonçalves (this
section) on the Beira and Nampula corridors of Mozambique, where the creation of
NGO-supported projects, framed around women’s empowerment and involvement in
commercial agriculture, has contributed to the active participation of a limited number
of smallholders in ‘demonstration fields’ in anticipation of future government and donor
supported projects.54
Based on both real economies and speculative anticipation therefore, corridors become
spaces for the playing out of elite politics – between central government and party elites,
business players of different sorts and local leaders, including traditional chiefs or govern-
ment officials with control over land.55 With investor and aid money in the mix, the
opportunities for patronage arrangements, corruption and deal-making are rife. Patterns
of accumulation ‘from above’ are thus conditioned by these political relationships, with
speculation on land and resources being made possible, as they become revalued
through investment. In Lamu and Isiolo, both considered as important ‘nodes’ of the
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proposed LAPSSET corridor, public and communal land is being reconceptualised as
private property through various (speculative) land buying and enclosure practices,
coupled with rising demands for the formalisation of individual land claims, based on
expectations of future returns from anticipated investments along the corridor.56 In this
complex milieu, who benefits and who loses from corridor developments? Much
depends on the terms of inclusion into new investments, the actors involved and the net-
works and alliances that emerge – and the politics of all this. Processes of incorporation are
frequently mediated by long-run, historical antecedents, as previous conflicts over land
and resources are replayed in a new setting. Ethnic politics is often central, as claims
over resources are contested between ‘autochthones’ and a state promoting a national
development project.57
As Sulle (this section) shows for Tanzania, the benefits of large investments may be
spread thinly and captured by only certain groups. Those able to benefit, say from out-
grower contracting arrangements for new sugar investments in the SAGCOT area, are
often those with larger farm areas, where they can guarantee food production.58 Those
without, must commute between sugar plots and other areas, undermining livelihood
opportunities.59 Employment generated by such investments may benefit women, but
may be increasingly insecure.60 Equally, in the pastoral areas of Kenya, those able to
benefit from market and infrastructure developments are often male, larger herd
owners (usually of large stock), and intermediary traders.61 ‘Making markets work for
the poor’ is a neat slogan, but is often undermined by the realities of capital concentration,
limits of access and control, with multiple gender, ethnic, age and class implications.
While the critique of corridors – and ‘land grabs’ more generally – has focused on the
role of foreign investors, the role of local endogenous capital, with business and political
elites, in facilitating such processes of enclosure and extraction has often been under-
played.62 For example, in pastoral areas, ‘indigenous agricultural commercialisation’
results in similar patterns of exclusion and small-scale grabs of land and resources, as
part of a process of commodification and social differentiation in pastoral societies, inter-
woven and co-produced with state territorialisation and sedentarisation.63 These processes
are more often than not, facilitated by grand-developmental schemes such as corridors.64
It is the coincidence of diverse logics of capital, emanating from different quarters, that
is significant, and where these coincide to benefit certain groups, the prospects for ‘pro-
poor’ outcomes diminish. Many development efforts are explicit about focusing on ‘emer-
ging’ farmers, and those already connected to markets, allowing them to ‘step up’ in their
livelihood trajectories.65 This accepts the dynamic of social differentiation, and selective
accumulation, although rarely explicitly. This has consequences for who is able to
benefit, with implications for class formation (as some step up, others may drop out, or
move to become labourers rather than producers), gender dynamics (very often the
terms of incorporation are skewed towards those who have existing power and assets,
invariably men to the exclusion of women) and generational relations (as such dynamics
often consolidate the power and control of an older generation, as they grow herds,
increase land areas and so on).
As already discussed, the business configurations of investments can also have major
impacts. Thus, large enclave investments in agriculture in the form of centrally-
managed estates or plantations may offer limited opportunity for positive ‘spill-over’ or
‘linkage’ effects in the wider economy, especially if labour is hired from outside the
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region, as is often the case.66 By contrast, investments that explicitly include an outgrower
element, whereby smallholder farmers produce on contract for a core estate or processing
plant, then different production relations can emerge, even though the terms of incorpor-
ation and benefits will be differentiated.67 Similarly, in livestock systems, the siting of
markets, their scale and links to abattoirs or live export facilities, makes a big difference
to how producers engage with such commercialisation ventures.68
Understanding how capital, labour, land and social relations are configured in an
investment is thus essential to understand what outcomes are possible. Across the cases
we present and examine, we expect these to be quite different, and even different across
particular agricultural investments within the broad spatial areas defined as a single cor-
ridor. Comparing and contrasting these will help elaborate how corridor and business
model designs influence outcomes, and how tensions are played out between corridors
as linear routes for the extraction of commodities for the exploitation of local economies,
and as part of global value chains, or corridors as focal points – clusters, hubs, poles – for
growth and local economic development and empowerment. With different logics of
accumulation and different intersections of interests, across the cases we see contrasting
alliances – between for example national/international capital and local endogenous
capital or between the central and local state – and different forms of conflict and opposi-
tion emerging.
Pathways to agricultural commercialisation: diverse outcomes
As our studies across eastern Africa have shown, despite the hype and the considerable
sums of money deployed, the grand visions of growth corridors are often not realised;
or at least not in ways imagined by their architects. Inevitably, all have changed over
time through diverse local, national and international political and economic
contestations.
Most corridors envisage trans-national connections, and so planning and implemen-
tation processes become embroiled in regional politics, sometimes upsetting the visions
of economic integration and regional development. Grand plans on maps may not be
realised as politics intervenes. The oil pipeline route from Uganda has moved several
times, as the highly anticipated one from South Sudan remains a distant reality, changing
the economic drivers of the LAPSSET project as a result.69 The vision for the Beira corri-
dor stretching fromMozambique into Zimbabwe has changed, as the Zimbabwe economy
collapsed and the opposition group, Renamo, have returned to violence in parts of
Mozambique.70 The Nacala corridor in Mozambique equally has shifted scope and direc-
tion many times, as different interests have been accommodated, changes in commodity
prices affected the economics of agricultural enterprises, and protests against the ProSA-
VANA project – a joint Japan-Brazil-Mozambique initiative in the savannah zone of the
Nacala corridor – increased.71
As Hagmann and Stepputat point out, despite their proposed function as facilitating
trade, corridors also very often ‘concentrate friction’.72 This friction materialises in the
form of checkpoints, borders, taxation and bureaucratic procedures, transport congestion,
and political and sometimes violent conflicts.73 This means that the performance of auth-
ority, by the state and other hybrid constellations, is focused in such areas, resulting in
multiple sources of tension, negotiation and competition.74
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Forms of resistance, and the alliances that are generated both for and against such cor-
ridors, therefore potentially offer important insights into the political economy of agricul-
tural investment and development. Contentious local politics intersect with the wider
politics of corridor development, resulting in frictions between national alliances and
local demands.75 State- and capital-led visions come up against ‘vernacular securities’
rooted in local authority structures and local histories and tensions around the role of
the state in the rural margins. By looking both at local mobilisations and resistances, as
well as the national political dynamics that drive such investments, the everyday politics
of corridors can be exposed.
This is less neat than the grand plans suggest, or even what the opposition narratives
against corridors propose. Thus, for example, in the Nacala corridor in Mozambique,
the site of the much contested ProSAVANA project, protests against the scheme have
resulted in significant changes in plans, even before implementation got properly under-
way.76 In the proposed LAPSSET corridor, Chome (this section) shows how increased
competition over land and resources, and other related forms of conflict, has preceded
the laying down of the formal infrastructure.77 Cases are reported where beacons demar-
cating routes and plots have been moved or disappeared, where people have started estab-
lishing rights over land along the corridor, where old territorial, and ethnically-defined
institutions have been revived to assert claims, and where pastoralist raiding has inten-
sified as different groups jostle for position in the expectation of benefits, or to protect
themselves from the effects of enclosure and potential marginalisation.78
Despite changes in plans and implementation in each case, the corridor investments are
nevertheless having significant impacts on patterns of agricultural investment and path-
ways of commercialisation across eastern Africa. This may occur through investments
in particular agricultural initiatives, ranging from the establishment of estates/plantations,
the creation of block farms and cooperative groups, to contract farming arrangements,
with or without nucleus estates, or through infrastructure development, including roads
and rail that change market opportunities and relations. Yet, as the articles in this
special section show, these results are not necessarily as planned; new actors get involved,
new networks are created, older ones entrenched or dismantled, and new opportunities
arise. The terms of inclusion in the corridor – and its construction by people and artefacts
– are always contested.
Conclusion
A political economy approach to corridors, we argue, is essential if we are to get beyond
the standard, and limited, emphasis on economic and implementation questions, where
failures are attributed to inappropriate incentives or lack of ‘political will’. As competing
interests interact in a particular area, defined as a corridor, the resulting outcomes for
different groups of people is inevitably complex, and context-specific. Yet a study of cor-
ridors – and their agricultural dimensions in particular – does offer, we argue, the potential
to challenge assumptions about the linearity and predictability of agricultural commercia-
lisation in Africa.
A number of questions emerge for exploring the political economy of agricultural
growth corridors along the eastern seaboard of Africa. These go beyond the standard
focus on the economics of the investments, and the practicalities of corridor
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implementation. Instead, a political economy lens allows us to explore how such invest-
ments are imagined, and are co-constituted with states and elite politics at multiple
levels. It allows us to examine how spatial imaginaries are imposed but also re-envisioned
within lived-in landscapes and economies. It also allows us to see what happens when such
visions collide with local realities, and what new practices and resistances – overt and
hidden – emerge to contest pathways of development.
In the articles of this section we take different approaches to political economy. Each
article asks what happens when the grand visions of corridors ‘hit the ground’, often in
situations when there are not many tangible features of ‘a corridor’. Corridor discourses
and imaginaries though do have material effects as new networks emerge, which
disrupt and challenge a simple linear, tunnel model. What these different forms take is
illustrated through examples from all three countries. The article on SAGCOT in Tanzania
focuses on contestations – especially over land and market opportunities – and the types of
resistances and accommodations that are reached between interest groups including state-
capital alliances and diverse groups of local people on the ground, with different opportu-
nities for accumulation resulting. The article on LAPSSET in Kenya focuses more on what
happens as the promises of corridor development unfold in a particular place, and the
diverse ‘economies of anticipation’ that are articulated by different groups – from
farmers to civil society groups to politicians – as the terms of inclusion are negotiated
even in advance of any big investments. The article on Nacala and Beira corridors in
Mozambique looks at the political economies of often mundane, ordinary everyday prac-
tice, focusing on the ‘demonstration fields’ as corridors are performed through alliances,
projects, infrastructure investments and agricultural fairs. Through these processes, corri-
dors are constructed and enacted, mediated by project officers from NGOs, state extension
agents and others, leading to very different results to the grand plans and visions.
Emphasising the diverse politics and practices of corridor-making – and the complex
articulations with states, capital and local communities, all articles focus attention on
the classic questions of political economy – who owns what, who gains what and what
they do with it. Through different lenses, the focuses remain on the processes of differen-
tiation that result, outlining of unexpected winners and losers. This, in turn points to a new
dynamic of accumulation resulting from corridors, and their imaginaries, as new forms of
capital intervene (or are expected to) in previously marginal agrarian and pastoral settings.
As we have discussed, in all cases, the grand modernist visions are disrupted, and
instead diverse, contingent and uncertain outcomes result. This analysis reveals much
about how capital, states and local political and economic processes intersect in previously
marginal areas and in processes of agricultural commercialisation in an era and context
where both state capacity and global capital and finance have their limits.
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